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Abstract
Understanding peer effects - On the nature, estimation and channels of peer effects**
This paper estimates peer effects in a university context where students are randomly 
assigned to sections. While students benefit from better peers on average, low-
achieving students are harmed by high-achieving peers. Analyzing students’ course 
evaluations suggests that peer effects are driven by improved group interaction rather 
than adjustments in teachers’ behavior or students’ effort. We further show, building on 
Angrist (2014), that classical measurement error in a setting where group assignment 
is systematic can lead to substantial overestimation of peer effects. With random 
assignment, as is the case in our setting, estimates are only attenuated.
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1 Introduction 
The promise of the peer effects literature is to provide policy makers with advice that can be used 
to increase overall performance by simply reorganizing peer groups. When looking at the by now 
substantial number of published articles that estimate peer effects in education, it becomes 
apparent that the literature has not yet delivered this promise. This can be seen, for example, in 
the recent review by Sacerdote (2011), who shows that size and even the sign of peer effects 
estimates notably differ between and even within primary, secondary and post-secondary 
education. 
One potential reason why peer effects estimates are so varied is that there are a number of 
social and statistical forces that lead to similar outcomes between peers, even in the absence of 
causal peer effects (Angrist, 2014; Manski, 1993). Two well-known challenges to the 
identification of peer effects are the selection and reflection problem. The selection problem 
states that peer groups are usually formed endogenously and that it is empirically difficult to 
distinguish peer effects from selection effects. The reflection problem states that it is impossible 
to distinguish the effect of peers on the individual from the effect of the individual on peers if 
both are determined simultaneously. A number of recent peer effects studies (Carrell, Fullerton, 
& West, 2009; Carrell, Sacerdote, & West, 2013; Duflo, Dupas, & Kremera, 2011; Lyle, 2007) 
have convincingly addressed the selection and reflection problems by studying peer effects in a 
setting where students are exogenously assigned to peer groups and by using pre-treatment 
characteristics as measures for peer ability. Even these estimates, however, might be biased due 
to a mechanical relationship between the measures of own and peer ability as described in 
Angrist (2014). The nature of this bias is still poorly understood. 
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In the analytical part of this paper, we build on Angrist (2014) to analyze the role of 
measurement error in the estimation of peer effects. We show that classical measurement error —
which is usually associated with attenuation bias — can lead to overestimation of peer effects. 
We find that the size and direction of this bias depends on the true underlying peer effect and the 
group assignment mechanism. We show, both analytically and using Monte Carlo simulations, 
that in settings where peers are randomly assigned, classical measurement error will only lead to 
attenuation bias. With systematic student assignment, however, measurement error can lead to 
substantial overestimation of peer effects. This bias is distinct from selection bias. 
Besides estimation bias, the large heterogeneity in peer effect estimates might reflect that 
peer effects are generated by mechanisms that are highly context specific. Take, for example, 
adjustment of teachers’ behavior as one potential channel of peer effects. While Duflo et al. 
(2011) have shown that this channel matters in Kenyan classrooms, it is irrelevant in the settings 
where peer groups have no common teachers like in living communities (Carrell et al., 2009; 
Carrell et al., 2013; Lyle, 2007; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003). A better understanding of 
the channels that drive peer effects could lead to a better understanding about why they differ 
across contexts. So far, there exists only limited empirical evidence on the channels of peer 
effects.
1
 
In the empirical part of this paper we estimate peer effects in academic achievement in a 
setting where peers are randomly assigned to sections at the university level. The data consists of 
all students enrolled at the School of Business and Economics (SBE) at Maastricht University 
and their grades over a period of three years, which amounts to 7,672 students and 39,813 grades. 
                                                     
1
 See, for example, Duflo et al. (2011) for evidence on channels in primary education, Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser  
(2012) in secondary education and Booij, Leuven and Osterbeek (2015) in post-secondary education.  
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Course participants are assigned to sections, groups of 10 to 15 students, which spend most of 
their contact hours together in one classroom. Our measure of student performance is course 
grades. Following the standard approach in the literature, to avoid the reflection problem, we use 
a pre-treatment indicator of peer quality: the past GPA of the peers. To identify potential non-
linearities in peer effects, we estimate heterogeneous effects in terms of student and peer 
achievements. Finally, we use data on students’ individual level course evaluation to shed some 
light on which channels might be driving the observed peer effects in our setting. 
Our results for the linear-in-means specification show that being assigned to a section 
with, on average, higher-achieving peers increases students’ grades in that course by a 
statistically significant but small amount. A one standard deviation increase in the average peer 
GPA causes an increase of 1.26 percent of a standard deviation in student grades. This result, 
however, masks important heterogeneity: low-achieving students are actually harmed by high-
achieving peers. Analyzing students’ course evaluations, we find suggestive evidence that the 
main channel of the observed peer effects is improved group interaction. We find no evidence for 
an adjustment in teachers’ behavior or student effort driven by the section peer composition.  
Taken together this article makes three main contributions. First, our discussion of the 
role of measurement error in the estimation of peer effects sheds light on a potential threat to the 
identification of peer effects that has so far been poorly understood. Second, we provide clean 
estimates of peer effects using a large dataset of randomly assigned students. Third, we are 
among the first to provide evidence of the underlying channels of peer effects using students’ 
course evaluations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing 
literature. Section 3 builds on Angrist (2014) to analyze how measurement error biases the 
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estimation of peer effects. Section 4 describes the institutional environment studied and the 
assignment procedure of students into sections. Section 5 discusses the dataset. Section 6 
provides evidence that the assignment to sections is random, conditional on scheduling 
constraints. Section 7 discusses the empirical strategy and the results. Section 8 investigates 
underlying channels using students’ course evaluations. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2   Literature Review 
The size and nature of peer effects estimates across the vast literature are quite varied and appear 
highly context specific. In his review, Sacerdote (2011) shows that peer effects estimates at the 
mean vary from a decrease of 0.12 points (Vigdor & Nechyba, 2007) to an increase of 6.8 points 
(C. Hoxby, 2000) for a 1.0 point increase in the average test score of the peers in primary and 
secondary education.
2
 Estimates of non-linear effects in these studies also differ substantially. 
While there is some evidence of high achieving students benefiting from high achieving peers, 
overall there is no reliable pattern across studies (see Sacerdote (2011) and studies cited within). 
In the context of post-secondary education, a number of studies address the selection 
problem by exploiting exogenous assignment of students to sections (Booij et al., 2015; De 
Giorgi, Pellizzari, & Woolston, 2012), dorm rooms (e.g., Brunello, De Paola, & Scoppa, 2010; 
Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003) and living communities in military colleges (Carrell et al., 
2009; Carrell et al., 2013; Lyle, 2007). Linear-in-mean point estimates in these environments are 
typically small and positive or statistically insignificant. 
                                                     
2
 See also Epple and Romano (2011) and Sacerdote (2014) for recent reviews.  
 - 4 - 
 
 
The inconsistencies of the peer effects literature have been attributed to endogeneity in 
peer group formation (Brock & Durlauf, 2001; Lin, 2010) and estimation bias (Angrist, 2014). 
We think that there are at least two other reasons why we might expect results to differ between 
studies: First, peer effects estimates are often presented in terms of standard deviations in a given 
sample, and estimates of non-linear effects usually rely on dividing students into achievement 
quantiles (Sacerdote, 2014). These results are not comparable across studies because reported 
peer effect estimates might actually reflect differences in achievement distributions rather than 
differences in peer effects. Second, peer effects can run through a number of potential channels 
which are likely to generate different peer effects depending on the contexts in which they are 
studied. While peer effects in primary and secondary education might partly run through 
classroom disruptions (Figlio, 2007; Lazear, 2001), these channels might be less pronounced in 
post-secondary education. Moreover, teachers’ adjustments of pedagogical practice to the 
classroom composition might be an important channel for classroom settings (Duflo et al., 2011; 
Lavy et al., 2012), but this channel will not matter when studying peer effects in roommate 
settings. For living communities where peers spend a great deal of time together, we would 
expect student effort, i.e., adjustments in (joint) study hours, to be an important channel 
(Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2006).  
 
3  Measurement Error and the Estimation of Peer Effects 
In a recent overview, Angrist (2014) discusses many threats to the identification of peer effects. 
In particular, he shows, building on earlier work by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), that 
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measurement error can lead to overestimation of peer effects.
3
 This might seem counterintuitive 
since measurement error is usually associated with attenuation bias. The key problem in this 
context is that measurement error in own ability will automatically lead to measurement error in 
measured group ability because it is an aggregate of the individual ability measures. Since ability 
will always be measured with some error, a typical peer effects regression will thus contain two 
mismeasured independent variables, which makes the direction of the bias unclear. We phrase the 
discussion below in terms of the estimation of peer effects, but it generalizes to other settings 
where one independent variable is the group average of another mismeasured independent 
variable.
4
 In these settings measurement error can lead to an upward bias in the group average 
coefficient.  
We believe Angrist has uncovered an important source of bias that deserves further 
investigation since he does not explicitly show under which assignment mechanisms an upward 
bias exists or how the magnitude of this bias depends on the underlying parameters. In this 
section we will therefore first review Angrist’s decomposition of the peer effects coefficient. 
Then, expanding upon this, we will show how classical measurement error can lead to 
overestimation of peer effects. Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations to show how the size of 
this bias varies under different peer assignment regimes. 
 
                                                     
3
 See also Moffitt (2001) and Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) for a discussion on the role of measurement error in 
the estimation of peer effects. 
4
 The problem we describe here for the estimation of peer effects also arises in other contexts, for example, when 
including both own household income and the average household income in a geographic area in the same 
regression. Whenever “own status” and some group average of this status are included in the same regression 
measurement error can lead to upward bias in the estimated group coefficient. 
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3.1 Decomposition of the Peer Effects Estimator 
Consider the following OLS regression model 
𝑦𝑖𝑔 = 𝜇 + 𝜋0𝑥𝑖 +  𝜋1?̅?𝑔 + 𝜉𝑖,      (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑔 is the grade of student 𝑖 in group 𝑔, 𝑥𝑖 is the measure of student ability, ?̅?𝑔 is the 
average of 𝑥𝑖 in group 𝑔, 𝜉𝑖 is an error term and 𝐸[𝜉𝑖  |𝑥𝑖] =  𝐸[𝜉𝑖  |?̅?𝑔] = 0. For simplicity we 
will discuss group average measures of ability as opposed to the leave-out means (i.e., the group 
average excluding student i) as this distinction matters little econometrically. In particular, 
Angrist (2014) has shown that the peer effects estimator, when using leave-out means instead of 
group averages, differs only by a factor of  
𝑁𝑔
𝑁𝑔−1
, where 𝑁𝑔 is the size of group g. Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001) have shown that in this setup the population parameter 𝜋1 is equal to   
𝜋1 = 𝜙(𝜓𝐼𝑉 − 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆) ≈  𝜓𝐼𝑉 − 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆,      (2) 
where 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 is equal to the population coefficient from a bivariate regression of 𝑦𝑖𝑔 on 𝑥𝑖, and 
𝜓𝐼𝑉 is the population coefficient of ability in a two-stage least squares IV regression of 𝑦𝑖𝑔 on 
ability using group dummies as instruments for ability. 𝜙 =
1
1−𝑅2
, where 𝑅2 is the R-squared 
from the first stage of the above IV regression.
5
 As this R-squared is typically close to zero, the 
peer effects estimator is approximately equal to the difference between the IV and OLS estimator 
of grades on own ability. 
One can see from Equation (2) that not only peer effects, but all factors that lead to a 
difference between 𝜓𝐼𝑉 and 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 will affect 𝜋1. We will focus here on measurement error in 𝑥𝑖 
                                                     
5
 Definitions of 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 , 𝜓𝐼𝑉and 𝑅
2 can be found in Appendix A1.1. 
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as a plausible reason why 𝜓𝐼𝑉 and 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 would differ even in the absence of peer effects.
6
 But 
how can measurement error lead to an overestimation of peer effects? The intuition behind this is 
as follows: If there is measurement error in 𝑥𝑖, both 𝜓𝐼𝑉 and 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 are attenuated. When student 
assignment to peer groups is systematic, 𝜓𝐼𝑉 is, in the absence of actual peer effects, less 
attenuated than 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆, which leads to an overestimation of peer effects. While Angrist also argues 
that the direction of the bias depends on the assignment mechanism, he is—probably due to the 
condensed nature of his overview—not explicit on why this is the case. We show this bias 
analytically in the next section. 
 
3.2 Measurement Error and Bias of 𝝅𝟏 
We model the grade data generating process as follows:  
𝑦𝑖𝑔 = 𝛿 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖
∗ + 𝛽1?̅?𝑔
∗ +  𝑢𝑖,      (3) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑔 is the grade of student i in group g, 𝑥𝑖
∗ is student i’s latent ability, 𝑥𝑔
∗ is the group 
average of 𝑥𝑖
∗ in group 𝑔, 𝛿 is a constant, 𝛽0 is the causal effect of ability on grade and the 
parameter of interest, 𝛽1, is the causal effect of group average ability on grade. We, however, 
only observe a noisy measure of individual ability, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
∗ + 𝜀𝑖, where 𝜀𝑖 is classical 
measurement error, which has a mean of zero and is independent of 𝑥𝑖
∗, ?̅?𝑔
∗ and 𝑢𝑖. Measurement 
error in the measure of individual ability will automatically lead to measurement error in the 
measure of group ability so that ?̅?𝑔 = ?̅?𝑔
∗ + 𝜀?̅?, where ?̅?𝑔
∗ and  𝜀?̅? are the respective averages of  𝑥𝑖
∗ 
and 𝜀𝑖 in group g. To focus this discussion on the role of measurement error, we assume that 
                                                     
6
 Angrist further mentions weak instrument bias: If students are randomly assigned to groups an IV with a weak first 
stage might bias 𝜓𝐼𝑉 towards 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 which would bias peer effects estimates towards zero. 
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𝐸[𝑢𝑖  |𝑥𝑖
∗] =  𝐸[𝑢𝑖  |?̅?𝑔
∗] = 0, which means that if we would perfectly observe 𝑥𝑖
∗ and ?̅?𝑔
∗ (i.e., if 
𝜀𝑖 = 0), 𝜋1 would be equal to 𝛽1.
7
 We take Equation (2) as a starting point and further 
decompose the peer effects estimator given the definition of variables and data generating process 
defined above. For brevity, we do the analytical step-by-step decomposition in Appendix A1.1, 
where we show that: 
𝜋1 = 𝛽1𝜙(
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
) + 𝛽0𝜙(
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
).   (4) 
Note that 𝜙, which is equal to 
1
1−𝑅2
, is always larger than one and usually close to one. We define 
W ≡ 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
 and Q ≡ 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
 and can thus rewrite Equation (4) like this:  
 𝜋1 = 𝛽1𝜙𝑊 + 𝛽0𝜙𝑄.        (5) 
We show in Appendix A1.2 that without measurement error 𝜋1 is equal to 𝛽1. We further 
show that 𝜙W will always range between 0 and 1, and in the case of random assignment to peer 
groups, it will be equal to the test reliability of ability 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
. So 𝜙W alone would only lead to an 
attenuation of 𝜋1. To understand any potential upward bias of 𝜋1, we need to understand the 
relationship between the ratio of variances of latent to measured group average ability 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
  
and the ratio of variances of latent to measured individual ability 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
 in 𝑄. When all 
individual ability measures have the same variance, we can rewrite 𝑄 as (see Appendix A1.2): 
 𝑄 =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖)
(1+ (𝑁𝑔−1)𝜌)
 
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) 
,    (6) 
                                                     
7
 Note that throughout this paper we understand ability very broadly as all stable factors that influence grades, 
including innate ability, motivation, and access to academic resources. 
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where 𝜌 is the average correlation of the distinct student abilities in group g,8 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) is the 
variance of the measurement error. 
Understanding the role of 𝜌 is central in understanding a potential upward bias in 𝜋1. 
Importantly, when students are randomly assigned, 𝜌 will be zero and the first and second term of 
Equation (6) will be equal in size. This means that Q will be zero and 𝜋1 will only be attenuated. 
When students of similar ability tend to be grouped together, 𝜌 will be positive, and the first term 
of Equation (6) will be larger than the second one; hence, Q will be positive. In this case—
assuming that the effect of own ability on grade 𝛽0 is positive—𝜋1will be upward biased in the 
absence of peer effects. Given that 𝜌 is positive, the bias will increase with the group size 𝑁𝑔. 
Note that a positive 𝜌 can also be driven by non-random grouping at a higher level. In our setting, 
for example, students’ course selection is non-random, while assignment to sections within 
courses is random. Fortunately, including course fixed effects eliminates this problem by taking 
out the correlation of individual abilities, which is driven by systematic assignment of students to 
courses.
9
  
Figure (1) visualizes our analytical findings by describing the bias as a function of the true peer 
effects for different values of 𝜌. To get an idea about the potential size of the bias we use 
plausible values for the variables and parameters in Equation (4). In particular, we set 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗) =
1 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) = 1/9 to get a high test reliability of 0.9, which is approximately the test 
                                                     
8
 More specifically, ρ =
1
𝑁𝑔(𝑁𝑔−1)
∑
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖
∗,𝑥𝑗
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑁𝑔
𝑖≠𝑗
. 
9
 When including course fixed effects, Equation (4) holds if we replace 𝑥𝑖 with the residuals of a regression of 𝑥𝑖 on 
course dummies, ?̃?𝑖, throughout. ?̃?𝑖 is the ability measure demeaned at the course level (see: Angrist, 2014; Frisch & 
Waugh, 1933). 
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reliability of the SAT for measured ability (The College Board, 2014). The effect of own ability 
on grade 𝛽0 is set to 0.6, which is approximately equal to the coefficient of the measure of own 
ability in our setting. We also assume that own ability, peer ability and grade are measured with 
the same scale so that we can compare the magnitude of the bias with typical peer effects 
estimates from the review of Sacerdote (2011). For 𝜌 = 0, as is the case under random 
assignment, peer effect estimates are only attenuated. For 𝜌 > 0 peer effects estimates are upward 
biased in the absence of peer effects, and this bias declines as peer effects increase.  
 
Figure 1: Bias as a Function of the Actual Peer Effects for Different Values of 𝛒 
 
Note: This Figure is based on Equation (4), with 𝛽0 = 0.6, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗) = 1 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) = 1/9 . 
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The overall direction of the bias depends on whether the upward bias caused by 𝛽0𝜙𝑄 
exceeds the attenuation bias caused by 𝛽1𝜙𝑊 (see Equation (5)). The potential magnitude of the 
bias is substantial: In the absence of peer effects, for example, and with a group assignment that 
leads to 𝜌 = 0.1, OLS estimates would, on average, wrongly suggest that a one point increase in 
peer ability leads to an approximately 0.04 point increase in grade. This bias would be even 
larger for more noisy ability measures: a test reliability of 0.6, for example, would lead to an 
upward bias of approximately 0.12. Differences in measurement error, degree of assortative 
assignment and group size between studies can thus contribute to the large heterogeneity in peer 
effects estimates through the mechanism described above. For comparison, the linear in means 
peer effects estimates  reported in the review by Sacerdote (2011) range from -0.12 to 6.8 with a 
median of 0.3.
10
  
 
3.3 Results from Monte Carlo Simulations 
To confirm our analytical results, we estimate Equation (3) using Monte Carlo simulations.
11
 We 
use the same values for variables and parameters as for Figure 1
12
 and show how results vary by 
the student assignment mechanism. In particular, we simulate an environment with 1,500 students 
who are divided into 10 courses. Each course has 10 sections, and each section has 15 students. 
To see how estimates depend on the true peer effect, we set 𝛽1 to 0 and 0.3. We test three 
                                                     
10
 This refers to the peer effects estimates for primary and secondary schools reported in Table 4.2 in Sacerdote 
(2011). 
11
 The Stata Do-file of this simulation be downloaded under:  http://ulfzoelitz.com/publications/extra-material 
12
 This means that 𝛽0 = 0.6, ability 𝑥𝑖
∗~𝑁(0,1), measurement error 𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0,1/9) and group ability ?̅?𝑔
∗ and its 
measure ?̅?𝑔  are calculated as laid out above. We set the error term of the model to 𝑢𝑖~𝑁(0,1). 
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different assignment mechanisms: 1) Random assignment to courses and sections, 2) Assortative 
course assignment and random section assignment, and 3) Random course assignment and 
assortative section assignment. Assortative assignment here means that students are assigned (or 
self-select) to peers with similar abilities. Under the random assignment, 𝜌 is approximately 0 
and assignment mechanisms 2 and 3 lead to a 𝜌 of approximately 0.1. The assortative assignment 
of students to sections is based on one variable which is correlated with ability. In practice this 
“assignment variable” may or may not be observable to the researcher. 
Table 1 shows the average difference between estimated and actual peer effects—an 
indication of the estimation bias—using OLS estimation with 1,000 Monte Carlo replications. 
The first rows of Panels A, B and C show that peer effect estimates are unbiased in the absence of 
measurement error for all assignment mechanisms. This confirms that the bias discussed here is 
not driven by selection bias in the classical sense.  
The second rows of Panels A, B and C show the results with measurement error. All 
results confirm our analytical discussion. Under random assignment to courses and sections, 
measurement error leads to attenuation bias (see Columns (3) and (4) of Panel A). With 
assortative assignment, however, peer effects are overestimated (see Columns (1) and (3) of 
Panels B and C). The size of the bias is as predicted by our analytical results: in the absence of 
peer effects, for example, and with course or section assignment that leads to a 𝜌 = 0.1, the bias is 
approximately 0.04 (see Column (1) of Panels B and C). As expected, the inclusion of course 
fixed effects eliminates the upward bias caused by assortative assignment to courses, and peer 
effects estimates are then only attenuated (see Column (4) of Panel B).  
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In many practically relevant settings, non-random assignment to sections (i.e., the peer 
group of interest) is likely to lead to a positive 𝜌. In the (rare) case where this assortative 
assignment is based on an observable assignment variable, controlling for this variable eliminates 
the potential upward bias. Estimates will then again only be attenuated (see Column (4) of Panel 
C). This applies, for example, when students are tracked within schools based on past 
performance observable to the researcher. In this case controlling for students’ past performance 
will eliminate the potential upward bias by the mechanism described above.  
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Table 1: Simulation Results on Bias in Peer Effects Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
        Actual peer effect = 0.00  Actual peer effect = 0.30 
Panel A Random course and section assignment (ρ = 0) 
     
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (Without measurement error) 
-0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0021 -0.0035 
[-0.0074 ; 0.0056] [-0.0086 ; 0.0049] [-0.0085 ; 0.0042] [-0.0102 ; 0.0032] 
 
    Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (With measurement error) 
0.0004 0.0011 -0.0302 -0.0310 
[-0.0066 ; 0.0059] [-0.0077 ; 0.0055] [-0.036 ; -0.0239] [-0.0377 ; -0.0242] 
     
Course fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Panel B Assortative course assignment & random section assignment (ρ = .1) 
     
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (Without measurement error) 
-0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0016 
[-0.0030 ; 0.0061] [-0.0058 ; 0.0091] [-0.0030 ; 0.0061] [-0.0058 ; 0.0091] 
     
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (With measurement error) 
0.0401 -0.0017 0.0268 -0.0307 
[0.0356 ; 0.0445] [-0.0054 ; 0.0088] [0.0223 ; 0.0313] [-0.0380 ; -0.0234] 
     
Course fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Panel C Random course assignment & assortative section assignment (ρ = .1) 
     
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (Without measurement error) 
0.0035 0.0038 0.0035 0.0038 
[-0.0090 ; 0.0080] [-0.0060 ; 0.0080] [-0.0090 ; 0.0080] [-0.0060 ; 0.0080] 
     
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (With measurement error) 
0.0421 -0.0032 0.0287 -0.0116 
[0.0377 ; 0.0464] [-0.0012 ; 0.0074] [0.0243 ; 0.0332] [-0.0161 ; -0.0071] 
     
Controlling for assignment variable NO YES NO YES 
Note: Monte Carlo simulations based on 1,000 repetitions for each reported estimate. 95% confidence intervals are 
in brackets [;]. 
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Given that ability can only be measured with some degree of error, these findings have 
different implications for studies from non-experimental and (quasi) experimental settings. 
Because in non-experimental settings assortative assignment is likely, measurement error can 
lead to an upward bias on top of any potential selection bias. Studies that use data from (quasi) 
experimental settings, on the contrary, do not have these problems. It has been already well- 
established that random assignment or systematic assignment based observables eliminates 
selection bias. We have now added to this by showing that in these settings measurement error 
will only lead to attenuation bias. In the remainder of this paper, we will present new evidence on 
the structure of peer effects in a setting where students were randomly assigned to university 
sections. 
 
4 Background 
 
4.1 Institutional Environment 
The data we collected for this paper comes from the School of Business and Economics (SBE) of 
Maastricht University, which is located in the south of the Netherlands.
13
 Currently there are 
approximately 4,200 students at the SBE enrolled in bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD programs. 
Because of its proximity to Germany, the SBE has a large German student population (53 
percent) mixed with students of Dutch (33 percent) and other nationalities. Approximately 37 
percent of the students are females. The academic year at the SBE is divided into four regular 
teaching periods of two months and two skills periods of two weeks. Students usually take two 
                                                     
13
 See also Feld, Salamanca and Hamermesh (2015) for a detailed description of the institutional background and 
examination procedure at the SBE. 
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courses at the same time in the regular periods and one course in the skills period. We exclude 
courses in skills periods from our analysis because these are often not graded and we could not 
always identify the relevant peer group.
14
 
The courses are organized by course coordinators, mostly senior staff, and many of the 
teachers are PhD students and teaching assistants. Each course is divided into sections with a 
maximum of 16 students. These sections are the peer group on which we focus. The course size 
ranges from 1 to 638 students, and there are 1 to 43 sections per course. The sections usually 
meet in two weekly sessions of two hours each. Most courses also have lectures that are followed 
by all students in the course and are usually given by senior staff. 
The SBE differs from other universities with respect to its focus on Problem Based 
Learning.
15
 The general Problem Based Learning setup is that students generate questions about a 
topic at the end of one session and then try to answer these questions through self-study. In the 
next session, the findings are discussed with other students in the section. In the basic form of 
PBL, the teacher plays only a guiding role, and most of the studying is done by the students 
independently. Courses, however, differ in the extent to which they give guidance and structure 
to the students, depending on the nature of the subject covered, with more difficult subjects 
usually requiring more guidance, and the preference of the course coordinator and teacher. 
Compared to the traditional lecture system, the Problem Based Learning system is 
arguably more group focused because most of the teaching happens in small groups in which 
group discussions are the central part of the learning process. Much of the students’ peer 
                                                     
14 
In some skills courses, for example, students are scheduled in different sections but end up sitting together in the 
same room. Furthermore, skills courses have no exam at the end of the skill period, and in many skills course, 
students do not receive a GPA-relevant grade but only a “pass” or a “fail” grade. 
15
 See http://www.umpblprep.nl/ for a more detailed explanation of PBL at Maastricht University. 
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interaction happens with members of their section, either in the sessions or while completing 
homework and in study groups. 
 
4.2 Students’ Course Evaluations 
Two weeks before the exam, students are invited by email to evaluate the courses they are 
currently taking in an online questionnaire.
16
 Students receive up to three email reminders, and 
the questionnaire closes before the day of the exam. Students are assured that their individual 
answers will not be passed on to anyone involved in the course. The teaching staff receives no 
information about the evaluation before they have submitted the final course grades to the 
examination office.
17
 This “double blind” procedure is implemented to avoid a situation where 
either of the two parties retaliates with negative feedback in the form of lower grades or 
evaluations. The exact length and content of the online questionnaires differ by course. The 
questionnaire typically contains 19-25 closed questions and two open questions. For our analysis, 
we use the nine core questions that are assessed in most courses that allow us to investigate the 
effect of peers on group functioning, student effort and teacher functioning. These questions ask 
students about how they perceived the instructor, how many hours they studied for the course, 
and about the interaction with their fellow students. Data on students’ course evaluations at the 
individual level were provided by the Department of Educational Research and Development of 
the SBE. The course evaluation data are described in greater detail in Section 8. 
 
                                                     
16
 For more information, see the course evaluation home page: http://iwio-sbe.maastrichtuniversity.nl/default.asp. 
17
 After exam grades are published, teaching staff receive the results of the courses evaluations aggregated at the 
section level. 
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4.3 Assignment of Students to Sections 
The Scheduling Department of the SBE assigns students to sections, teachers to sections, and 
sections to time slots. Before each period, there is a time frame in which students can register 
online for the courses they want to take. After the registration deadline, the scheduler is given a 
list of registered students and allocates the students to sections using a computer program. About 
ten percent of the slots in each group are initially left empty and are filled with students who 
register late.
18
 This procedure balances the amount of late registration students over the sections. 
Before the start of the academic year 2010/11, the section assignment for master’s courses and 
for bachelor’s courses was conducted with the program Syllabus Plus Enterprise Timetable using 
the allocation option “allocate randomly” (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Since the academic 
year 2010/11, all bachelor’s sections have been stratified by nationality with the computer 
program SPASSAT.
19
 Some bachelor’s courses are also stratified by exchange student status. 
After the assignment of students to sections, the sections are assigned to time slots, and the 
program Syllabus Plus Enterprise Timetable indicates scheduling conflicts.
20
 Scheduling conflicts 
arise for approximately 5 percent of the initial assignments. If the computer program indicates a 
scheduling conflict, the scheduler manually moves students between different sections until all 
scheduling conflicts are resolved. After all sections have been allocated to time slots, the 
                                                     
18
 About 5.6 percent of students register late. The number of late registrations in the previous year determines the 
number of slots that are initially left unfilled by the scheduler. 
19
 The stratification goes as follows: the scheduler first selects all German students (who are not ordered by any 
observable characteristic) and then uses the option “Allocate Students set SPREAD,” which assigns an equal number 
of German students to all classes. Then the scheduler repeats this process with the Dutch students and lastly 
distributes the students of all other nationalities to the remaining spots. 
20 
There are four reasons for scheduling conflicts: (1) the student takes another regular course at the same time; (2) 
the student takes a language course at the same time; (3) the student is also a teaching assistant and needs to teach at 
the same time; and (4) the student indicated non-availability for evening education. By default, all students are 
recorded as available for evening sessions. Students can opt out of this default position by indicating this in an online 
form. Evening sessions are scheduled from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., and approximately three percent of all sessions in our 
sample are scheduled for this time slot. 
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scheduler assigns teachers to the sections.
21
 The section and teacher assignment is then published. 
After publication, the scheduler receives information on late-registering students and allocates 
them to the empty slots. The schedulers do not know the students nor do they observe their 
previous grades. 
Only 20-25 students (less than one percent) officially switch sections per period. 
Switching sections is possible only through a student advisor and is allowed only for medical 
reasons or due to a conflict with sports practice for students who are on a list of top athletes.
22
 
Students sometimes switch their section unofficially when they have extra appointments. This 
type of switching is usually limited to one session, and students rarely switch sections 
permanently.
23
 
There are some exceptions to this general procedure.
 
First, when the number of late 
registering student exceeds the number of empty spots, the scheduler creates a new section that 
mainly consists of late registering students. We excluded eight late registration sections from the 
analysis.
24
 Second, for some bachelor’s courses, there are special sections consisting mainly of 
repeating students. Whether a repeater section is created depends on the preference of the course 
coordinator and the number of repeat students. We excluded 34 repeater sections from the 
analysis. Third, in some bachelor’s courses students who are part of the Maastricht Research 
                                                     
21
 Approximately ten percent of teachers indicate time slots when they are not available for teaching. They do so 
before they are scheduled, and the signature of the department chair is required. 
22
 We do not have a record for these students and therefore cannot exclude them. However, section switching in these 
rare cases is mostly due to conflicts with medical and sports schedules and therefore unrelated to section peers. 
23
 It is difficult to obtain reliable numbers on unofficial switching. From our own experience and consultation with 
teaching staff, we estimate that session switching happens in less than 1 percent of the sessions, and permanent 
unofficial class switching happens for less than 1 percent of the students. 
24
 Students who register late, for example, generally have a lower GPA and might be particularly busy or stressed 
during the period in which they registered late, which may also affect their performance. This dynamic might create 
a spurious relationship between GPA and grades.  
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Based Learning (MARBLE) program are assigned to separate sections where they often are 
assigned to more experienced teacher. Students of this program are typically the highest 
performing students of their cohort. We excluded 15 sections that consist of MARBLE students 
from the analysis.
25
 Fourth, in six courses, the course coordinator or other education staff 
influenced the section composition.
26
 We excluded these courses from our analysis. Fifth, some 
master’s tracks have part-time students. Part-time students are scheduled mostly in evening 
classes, and there are special sections with only part-time students. We excluded 95 part-time 
students from the analysis. Sixth, we excluded the first-year-first-period courses of the two 
largest bachelor’s programs (International Business and Economics) because in these courses 
only particular students, such as repeating student, have previous grades. Seventh, we excluded 
sections for which fewer than five students had a past GPA. For these courses, peer GPA does not 
reliably capture the peer quality of the students in the section. Eighth, we excluded sections with 
more than 16 students (two percent) because the official class size limit according to scheduling 
guidelines is 15, and in special cases 16. Sections with more than 16 students are a result of room 
availability constraints or special requests from course coordinators. We also excluded 36 courses 
from the estimation sample in which part of the final grade might have consisted of group graded 
components, such as joint papers or other jointly graded projects. After removing these 
exceptions, neither students nor teachers, and not even course coordinators, should have any 
influence the composition of the sections in our estimation sample.  
                                                     
25
 We identified pure late registration classes, repeater classes and MARBLE classes from the data. The scheduler 
confirmed the classes that we identified as repeater classes. The algorithm by which we identified late registration 
classes and MARBLE classes is available upon request. 
 
26
 The schedulers informed us about these courses. 
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5  Data 
We obtained data for all students taking courses at the SBE during the academic years 
2009/2010, 2010/2011 and 2011/2012. Scheduling data were provided by the Scheduling 
Department of the SBE. The scheduling data include information on section assignment, the 
allocated teaching staff and the day and time the sessions took place, as well as a list of late 
registrations for our sample period. In total, we have 7,672 students, 395 courses, 3,703 sections 
and 39,813 grades in our estimation sample. Panel A of Table 2 provides an overview of courses, 
sections and students in the different years.
27
 
The data on student grades and student background, such as gender, age and nationality, 
were provided by the Examinations Office of the SBE. The Dutch grading scale ranges from 1 to 
10, with 5.5 being the lowest passing grade.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
 
Academic year Number of courses 
Number of unique 
students 
Number of sections 
Average number of 
students per section 
Number of grades 
2009 / 10 110 3,819 1,134 13.21 11,925 
2010 / 11 141 4,018 1,346 13.08 13,768 
2011 / 12 144 4,131 1,223 14.18 14,120 
All years 395 7,672 3,703 13.50 39,813 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
27
 We refer to each course-year combination as a separate course, which means that we treat a course with the same 
course code that takes place in three years as three distinct courses. 
 - 22 - 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
Panel B 
  Mean S.D. Min 25p Median 75p Max Obs. 
Student level information 
          Course dropout 0.0841 0.278 0 0 0 0 1 43,471 
  Grade first attempt 6.537 1.886 1 6 7 8 10 39,813 
  Final grade 6.745 1.687 1 6 7 8 10 40,601 
  GPA 6.790 1.206 1 6.122 6.983 7.583 10 43,471 
         Section level information 
          Number of registered students per section 13.50 1.317 5 13 14 14 16 43,471 
  Number of students that dropped class 2.291 1.977 0 1 2 3 14 43,471 
  Peer GPA 6.757 0.471 4.897 6.441 6.776 7.096 8.500 43,471 
  Within section SD of peer GPA 1.126 0.365 0.104 0.869 1.105 1.360 2.799 43,471 
         
         Student Background information 
          Age 20.74 2.203 16.19 19.17 20.42 21.98 41.25 40,469 
  Female 0.369 0.483 0 0 0 1 1 40,469 
  Dutch 0.312 0.463 0 0 0 1 1 43,471 
  German 0.496 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 43,471 
  Bachelor student 0.793 0.406 0 1 1 1 1 43,471 
  BA International Business 0.403 0.491 0 0 0 1 1 43,471 
  BA Economics 0.280 0.449 0 0 0 1 1 43,471 
  Exchange student 0.0619 0.241 0 0 0 0 1 43,471 
Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the estimation sample. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Grades after the First Examination 
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of final grades in our estimation sample. The final course 
grade is often calculated as the weighted average of multiple graded components, such as the 
final exam grade, participation grade, presentation grade or midterm paper grade.
28
 The graded 
components and their respective weights differ by course, with most courses giving most of the 
weight to the final exam grade. If the final course grade of a student after taking the final exam is 
lower than 5.5, the student fails the course and has the option of taking a second and third attempt 
at the exam. We observe final grades after each attempt separately. For our analysis, we use only 
the final grade after the first exam attempt as an outcome measure because first- and second-
attempt grades are not comparable.
29
 For the construction of the student GPA, we use the final 
grades after the last attempt.
30
 
 Panel B of Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for our estimation sample. Our 
sample contains 43,471 student course registrations. Out of these, 3,658 (8 percent) dropped out 
of the course during the course period. We therefore observe 39,813 course grades after the first 
attempt. The average course grade after the first attempt is 6.54. Approximately one fifth of the 
graded students obtain a course grade lower than 5.5 after the first attempt and therefore fail the 
course. The average final course grade (including grades from second and third attempt) is 6.75, 
and the average GPA is 6.79. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the GPAs based on final grades. 
The peer GPA is the section-average GPA excluding the grades of the student of interest. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of peer ability, measured as the average GPA of all other students 
in the section. 
                                                     
28
 We excluded 36 courses in which part of the final grade might have consisted of group graded components from 
the estimation sample (see Section 4.3). 
29
 The second-attempt exam usually takes place two months after the first exam. 
30
 We decided to use the GPA calculated from final grades because this is closer to the popular understanding of 
GPA.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Student GPA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution Peer GPA 
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6 Test for Random Assignment of Students to Sections 
The scheduling procedure we describe in Section 4.3 shows that section assignment is random. 
Nevertheless, we test whether section assignment has the properties that one would expect under 
random assignment. In the spirit of standard randomization checks in experiments, we test 
whether section dummies jointly predict student pre-treatment characteristics when controlling 
for scheduling and balancing indicators. The pre-treatment characteristics we consider are GPA, 
age, gender, and student ID rank.
31
 For each course in our sample, we run a regression of pre-
treatment characteristics on section dummies as well as scheduling and balancing controls, and 
we F-test for joint significance of the section dummies. Thus, for each pre-treatment 
characteristic, we run approximately 400 regressions. Under conditional random assignment, the 
p-values of the F-tests of these regressions should be uniformly distributed with a mean of 0.5 
(Murdoch, Tsai, & Adcock, 2008). Furthermore, if students are randomly assigned to sections 
within each course, the F-test should reject the null hypothesis of no relation between section 
assignment and students’ pre-treatment characteristics at the 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent 
significance level in close to 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent of the cases, respectively.  
The results of these randomization tests confirm that the section assignment is random 
(Section A3 in the Appendix provides a more detailed description on our randomization check). 
The average of the p-values of the F-tests is close to 0.5 (see Table A1 in the Appendix), and the 
p-values are roughly uniformly distributed (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). Table 2 shows in 
                                                     
31
 For approximately 9 percent of our sample, mostly exchange students, we do not know the age, gender and 
nationality. In Maastricht University, ID numbers are increasing in tenure at the university. ID rank is the rank of the 
ID number. We use ID rank instead of actual ID because the SBE recently added a new digit to the ID numbers, 
which creates a discrete jump in the series.  
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how many cases the F-test actually rejected the null hypothesis at the respective levels. Column 
(1) shows the total number of courses for each pre-treatment characteristics. Column (3) shows 
that the actual rejection rates at the 5 percent level are close to the expected rejection rates under 
random assignment. The F-tests for the regressions with the dependent variables GPA, age and 
ID rank are rejected slightly more often than 5 percent, and the rejection rate for the dependent 
variable gender is slightly less than 5 percent. Columns (5) and (7) show the actual rejection rates 
at the 1 percent and 0.1 percent levels. Additionally, these rejection rates as a whole are close to 
the expected rates under random assignment, with the exception of age, where the rejection rates 
is only slightly higher than we expected. All together, we present strong evidence that section 
assignment in our estimation sample is random, conditional on scheduling and balancing 
indicators. 
 
Table 3: Randomization Check of Section Assignment 
  (1)   (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) (7) 
Dependent variable 
Total number 
of courses  
Number 
significant 
Percent 
significant  
Number 
significant 
Percent 
significant  
Number 
significant 
Percent 
significant 
Joint F-test significant: 
 
...at the 5 percent level 
 
...at the 1 percent level 
 
...at the 0.1 percent level 
GPA 395 
 
22 5.57% 
 
5 1.27% 
 
1 0.25% 
Age 392 
 
24 6.12% 
 
11 2.81% 
 
4 1.02% 
Gender 389 
 
18 4.63% 
 
3 0.77% 
 
0 0.00% 
ID rank 395   20 5.06%   8 2.03%   2 0.51% 
 
Note: This table is based on separate OLS regressions with past GPA, age, gender and ID rank as dependent 
variables. The explanatory variables are a set of section dummies, dummies for the other parallel course taken at the 
same time, and dummies for day and time of the sessions, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late 
registration status. Column (1) shows the total number of separate regressions. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show in how 
many regressions the F-test rejected the null hypothesis at the 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent level, respectively. 
Columns (3), (5) and (7) show for what percentage of the regressions the F-test rejected the null hypothesis at the 
respective levels. Differences in number of courses are due to missing observations for some of the dependent 
variables. 
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7  Empirical Strategy and Results 
7.1 Empirical Strategy 
We use the following model to estimate the effect of peers on grades:  
𝑌 𝑖𝑔𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝑃𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑔−𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑍𝑖𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡. (7) 
The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the grade of student 𝑖, in a course-specific section 𝑔, at 
time 𝑡. 𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the past GPA of student 𝑖, and 𝐺𝑃𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑔−𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average past GPA of all the 
students in the section excluding student 𝑖.  𝑍𝑖𝑔𝑡 is a vector of additional controls, and 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡 is an 
error term. In all specifications, 𝑍𝑖𝑔𝑡 consists of dummies for day of the week and time of the day 
of the sessions, German, Dutch, exchange student status, late registration status, and year-course-
period fixed effects.
32
 In other specifications, we also include other-course fixed effects—fixed 
effects for the other course taken at the same time—and teacher fixed effects.33 Note that 
𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑡−1 and 𝐺𝑃𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑔−𝑖,𝑡−1 might measure own and peer ability with some error.
 34
 This might bias 
our peer effects estimates through the mechanisms described in Section 3. Since group 
assignment is random at the section level and we include year-course-period fixed effects, this 
will lead to an attenuation of peer effects. Including stratification controls and teacher fixed 
effects should increase the precision but not affect the size of the estimates. Conceptually, 
                                                     
32
 For some sections, the time and day of the sessions were missing. We include separate dummies for these missing 
values. 
 
33
 Other-course fixed effects are only defined for students who take up to two courses per period. In only 1.5% of the 
cases, students were scheduled for more than two courses, and these students drop out of our sample when we 
include other-course fixed effects. Teacher fixed effects are fixed effects of the first teacher assigned to a session. 
34
 Further, note that the precision of own and peer achievement estimates increases with tenure when 𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑡−1 and 
𝐺𝑃𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑠−𝑖,𝑡−1 are calculated with more past grades. This means that we would expect any bias from measurement error 
to decrease with students’ tenure. 
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including scheduling controls and other-course fixed effects should pick up all leftover non-
random variation in section assignment that is due to conflicting schedules. To allow for 
correlations in the outcomes of students within each course, we cluster the standard errors at the 
course-year-period level. We standardized 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑡, 𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑡−1 and 𝐺𝑃𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑔−𝑖,𝑡−1 to have mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one over the estimation sample to simplify the interpretation of the 
coefficients. 
 
7.2 Linear-in-means Results 
Before we show estimates of peer effects on grades, we check whether peer GPA is related to 
course dropouts. The course dropout rate is only 8 percent at the SBE. OLS regressions, which 
we omit for brevity, show that neither average peer GPA nor the other peer GPA variables we use 
when estimating heterogeneous effects significantly predict course dropout. We therefore don’t 
worry about selection bias when interpreting peer effects estimates on grades. 
 
Table 4: Baseline Estimates – Linear-in-means 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Std. Grade Std. Grade Std. Grade Std. Grade 
          
Standardized peer GPA 0.0108* 0.0114* 0.0121** 0.0126** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Standardized GPA 0.5606*** 0.5605*** 0.5623*** 0.5622*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
     Observations 39,813 39,813 39,813 39,813 
R-squared 0.432 0.441 0.448 0.457 
Course FE YES YES YES YES 
Staff FE NO YES NO YES 
Other course FE NO NO YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the standardized course grade. All specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, 
German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. Other-course fixed effects refer to the course that 
students are taking at the same time. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions with the standardized grade as the 
dependent variable. The table shows that being assigned to section peers with a higher GPA 
causes higher course grades. The coefficient of standardized peer GPA is small but statistically 
significant in all models. The inclusion of teacher fixed effects and other-course fixed effects 
hardly change the effect size or its standard errors. The reported estimate in the most complete 
specification in Column (4) shows that being assigned to peers with a one standard deviation 
higher GPA increases the student’s grade by, on average, 1.26 percent of a standard deviation. 
The results are very similar when we define own and peer GPA solely based on first year grades 
(see Table A2 in the Appendix). In terms of the Dutch grading scale, this estimate means that, for 
example, an increase of peer GPA from 6.5 to 7.0 is associated with a grade increase from 6.50 to 
6.523, a small and economically insignificant effect. It follows from our discussion in Section 3 
that measurement error leads to attenuation of our estimator, and this attenuation is proportional 
to the test reliability of ability. To get a rough idea of the unattenuated coefficient, we can divide 
the coefficient by the split-half correlation of GPA, 0.72, an estimator of the test reliability.
35
 This 
increases the estimate to 1.75 percent of a standard deviation. 
To explore heterogeneous effects we extend the baseline analysis by additionally 
including interaction terms of peer GPA with dummies of course type or student gender. Table 5 
shows the results of this analysis, where we include the baseline results of Table 4 Column (4) in 
Column (1) for comparison. Column (2) shows that peer effects estimates are larger for master’s 
compared to bachelor’s courses, although the difference is not statistically significant. Previous 
                                                     
35
 In order to calculate the split-half correlation we randomly assigned all past grades of a student into two groups 
and constructed two GPAs based on these subgroups. The split-half correlation is the correlation of these ability 
measures.     
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studies have found that peer effects differ between technical and non-technical subjects. While 
Brunello et. al. (2010) and Carrel et al. (2009) find larger peer effects in technical subjects, 
Arcidiacono, Foster, Goodpaster and Kinsler (2012) find larger peer effects in non-technical 
subjects.
36
 To test whether peer effects in our settings differ by course technicality, we classified 
a course as “Technical” if at least one of the following words appeared in the course description: 
“math, mathematics, mathematical, statistics, statistical, theory focused.” Doing this, we 
categorized 31 percent of the courses as “Technical.” Column (3) shows that peer effects 
estimates are a little bit smaller in technical courses, but this difference is not statistically 
significant. Column (4) shows that estimated peer effects are somewhat larger for males, but 
again this difference is not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
36
 Brunello et al. (2010) compare peer effects estimates in hard science and social science majors. Carrell et. al. 
(2009) compare peer effects in math and science with humanities and social science courses. Arcidiacono et al. 
(2012) compare peer effects in humanities, social sciences, hard sciences and mathematics and find larger effects for 
humanities and social sciences.  
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Table 5: Linear-in-means Estimates with Course Type and Gender Interactions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Std. Grade Std. Grade Std. Grade Std. Grade 
    
 
  
 Standardized peer GPA 0.0126** 0.0303* 0.0153** 0.0164** 
 
(0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) 
Standardized peer GPA * bachelor course 
 
-0.0207 
  
  
(0.018) 
  Standardized peer GPA * Technical course 
  
-0.0077 
 
   
(0.012) 
 Standardized peer GPA * Female 
   
-0.0080 
    
(0.011) 
Standardized GPA 0.5622*** 0.5622*** 0.5622*** 0.5841*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Female 
   
0.0401*** 
    
(0.012) 
     Observations 39,813 39,813 39,813 37,210 
R-squared 0.457 0.457 0.457 0.475 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the standardized course grade. All specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, 
German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status, as well as fixed effects for courses, fixed effects 
for other courses taken at the same time and teacher fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
7.3 Heterogeneity by Own and Peer GPA 
The specifications in Tables 4 and 5 are linear-in-mean, which implicitly assumes that all 
students are linearly affected by the mean GPA of their peers. Previous studies, however, have 
shown that peer effects are likely heterogeneous with respect to both student and peer 
achievement (Burke & Sass, 2013; Carrell et al., 2013). We test for these two sources of 
heterogeneity simultaneously by estimating a two-way interaction model similar to those of 
Carrell et al. (2013) and Burke and Sass (2013). To do this, we classify students as high, middle 
and low GPA based on whether their GPA is in the top, middle or bottom third of the course 
GPA distribution, respectively. We then calculate for each section the fraction of peers with high 
and low GPA and include interactions of students’ own type (high, middle and low GPA) with 
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the fraction of high and low GPA peers in the model we estimate. The coefficient “High GPA * 
Fraction of High GPA peers,” for example, can be interpreted as showing how high GPA students 
are affected by increasing the fraction of high GPA peers in the section while keeping the fraction 
of low GPA peers constant. Put differently, the coefficient shows how high GPA students are 
affected if middle GPA peers (the reference group) are replaced with high GPA peers. 
Table 6 shows the coefficients of these six interactions. Overall, the estimated effects are 
small in magnitude: for example, the largest coefficient, “Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA 
peers,” suggests that an increase of 20 percent in low GPA peers, which is equivalent to replacing 
three out of 15 middle GPA peers with low GPA peers, decreases the grade of a low GPA 
students by 2.63 percent of a standard deviation. The results for high and middle GPA students 
are in line with the linear-in-mean model: high and middle GPA students are positively affected 
by high GPA peers and negatively affected by low GPA peers. The results for low GPA students, 
however, are noticeably different. The point estimate suggests that low GPA students are 
negatively affected by high GPA peers. They are also negatively affected by peers from their own 
GPA group—low GPA peers. The effect of increasing the fraction of high GPA peers is 
significantly different for low GPA students compared to high and middle GPA students. To 
visualize the heterogeneous results, we plot the coefficients of the interactions in Table 6 in 
Figure 5. It shows that although peer effects seem to increase linearly with peer GPA for high and 
middle GPA students, the effect first increases and then decreases for low GPA students.  
These estimates are qualitatively different from the pre-treatment findings of Carrell et al. 
(2013),  who exploit random assignment, which suggested that in particular low achieving 
students benefit from high achieving peers. This result, however, was not robust to an 
intervention in which low achieving students were assigned to squadrons with a large fraction of 
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high achieving peers. Contrary to the predictions of their pre-treatment findings, but in line with 
our results, low achieving students were actually harmed by this intervention.   
To put these findings into a broader perspective, it is useful to think about which of the 
existing peer effects models are consistent with the patterns we observe in the data. Hoxby and 
Weingarth (2005) review a number of models that differ in the structure of peer effects they 
generate. While it not really possible to point to one single model that explains all of our results, 
the evidence we present in this paper is largely consistent with the Bad Apple model.
37
 This 
model predicts that an increase in the proportion of bottom-achieving peers has a disproportionate 
negative effect on student achievement. Consistent with this, Table 6 shows that low GPA peers 
have a disproportionally large negative effect on high and low GPA students. Their effect on 
middle GPA students is also negative but small and not statistically different from zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                     
37
 The Shining Light model would predict that a few excellent students would have a disproportionate positive effect 
on all other students. According to the Boutique model, students benefit most from interacting with students of their 
own type. Our findings that low achievers are harmed by both a higher proportion of low and high GPA peers are 
inconsistent with the Boutique model and the Shining Light model. 
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects  
  (1) 
 
Std. Grade 
    
High GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.0410 
 
(0.053) 
High GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1047** 
 
(0.049) 
Middle GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.0789 
 
(0.052) 
Middle GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.0332 
 
(0.052) 
Low GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers -0.1449* 
 
(0.076) 
Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1315** 
 
(0.066) 
  Observations 39,813 
R-squared 0.461 
F fraction of high peers [middle vs low] 5.40** 
p-value 0.0207 
F fraction of high peers [high vs low] 4.38** 
p-value 0.0370 
F fraction of high peers [high vs middle] 0.26 
p-value 0.6114 
F fraction of low peers [middle vs low] 1.39 
p-value 0.2386 
F fraction of low peers [high vs low] 0.10 
p-value 0.7462 
F fraction of low peers [high vs middle] 1.14 
p-value 0.2867 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course level are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the 
standardized course grade. Additional controls include standardized GPA, course fixed effects, other-course fixed 
effects, teacher fixed effects as well dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange 
student status and late registration status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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  Figure 5: The Effect of Peer Fractions for Students with High, Middle and Low GPAs 
 
Note: The data points in this figure are taken from Table 5 using the fraction of middle-GPA peers as a reference 
category. 
 
 
8   Channels of Peer Effects 
8.1 Thinking about the Channels of Peer Effects 
The peer effects we estimated in the previous section might be driven by a number of potential 
channels. Equation (7) describes a simplified version of the education production function that 
establishes the role of three channels, which we can test empirically. 
  𝑌 𝑖𝑔( 𝑥𝑔) =  𝐺𝑖𝑔( 𝑥𝑔 )  + 𝐸𝑖𝑔( 𝑥𝑔)  +  𝑇𝑔( 𝑥𝑔)  +  𝜔𝑖𝑔,  (7) 
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𝑌𝑖𝑔 is the grade of student i in section g, which is a function of peer ability 𝑥𝑔 that enters through 
three channels: group functioning 𝐺𝑖𝑔( 𝑥𝑔 ), students’ effort 𝐸𝑖𝑔( 𝑥𝑔 )  and teacher functioning 
𝑇𝑔( 𝑥𝑔). 𝜔𝑖𝑔 captures all other omitted factors, including own ability and the effect of other 
channels.
 38
  
Prior to looking at the results, it is helpful to consider how we would expect these 
channels to matter in our specific setting. As described in more detail in Section 4.1, the Problem 
Based Learning teaching style practiced at the SBE has a large focus on classroom discussion in 
which students are supposed to explain the course content to each other. Since higher achieving 
students are likely more able to contribute in the classroom, we expect peer GPA to have a 
positive effect on group functioning. The expected direction of the effect of peer GPA on student 
effort and teacher functioning is less clear. On the one hand, better peers might induce students to 
work harder, e.g. via peer pressure, higher aspirations or social norms.
39
 On the other hand, lower 
performing students might be demotivated by much better peers and exert less effort. Regarding 
the teacher behavior, we would expect teachers to adjust to the classroom peer composition by 
altering the difficulty level of their instructions. While an instruction level closer to the own 
ability level might be beneficial, larger deviations are likely to be detrimental. Such a mechanism 
would then imply that students benefit from having more peers of similar abilities.
 40
 
 
                                                     
38
 For a theoretical model on how different channels might enter peer effects, see Duflo et al. (2011) and Conley 
Mehta, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2015). 
39
 See Mas and Moretti (2009) and Falk and Ichino (2006) for evidence of peer effects on effort provision. Peers 
expected performance might also provide a reference point which influences students’ effort provision (see Kőszegi 
and Rabin, 2006 and Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huffman 2011).  
40
 It is also possible that both students and teachers compensate for having worse peers by working harder. Such 
compensation behavior could explain why the peer effects on grades are overall small in magnitude. 
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8.2 Empirical Evidence on the Channels 
Table 7 shows the wording and answering scales of the items regarding group interaction, self-
study hours and teacher evaluation.
41
 In our estimation sample, 38 percent of the students start 
filling out the questionnaire. The last column in Table 7 shows that once students started the 
questionnaire, they answered almost all of items. Answering the course evaluation questionnaire 
is selective. We observe, for example, that students with higher GPAs are more likely to take part 
in the evaluation, and our results should be interpreted in light of this finding. We have 
nevertheless chosen to analyze students’ course evaluation for two reasons. First, the survey 
response is not significantly related to peer quality as measured by mean peer GPA or to the peer 
GPA variables used in Section 7.3 (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Second, the student 
evaluation data gives us a unique insight into potential mechanisms in a way that is not available 
in most other studies. All results, however, should be interpreted with caution, and we interpret 
them as providing suggestive evidence. 
For our analysis, we aggregate items in the domains of group functioning (two items) and 
teacher functioning (six items) by first summing all the standardized item answers and then 
standardizing the sum of these values in each domain so that the aggregated categories have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Answers to the question about self-study hours, 
which we use as a measure of student effort, are left in their natural unit. We impute missing 
values for items that students who started filling out the questionnaire did not answer either 
                                                     
41
 Standard items on the course evaluation questionnaire also include items about learning material and general 
course evaluation. For a complete list of all the standard evaluation items and how each item relates to mean peer 
GPA, see Table A4 in the Appendix.  
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because the question was not in their course specific questionnaire or because they chose not to 
answer the question.
42
 
 
Table 7: Evaluation Item, Answering Scales and Response Rates 
 
Nr Item Domain Item Wording 
Answer 
Scale 
Response Rate 
Conditional on 
Participation 
1 Group interaction My tutorial group has functioned well. 1 - 5 94.1% 
2 Group interaction 
Working in tutorial groups with my fellow-students helped me to 
better understand the subject matters of this course. 
1 - 5 93.5% 
3 Self-study hours 
How many hours per week on the average (excluding contact 
hours) did you spend on self-study (presentations, cases, 
assignments, studying literature, etc)? 
0 - 80 92.8% 
4 Teacher functioning 
Evaluate the overall functioning of your tutor in this course with a 
grade 
1 - 10 93.5% 
5 Teacher functioning The tutor sufficiently mastered the course content. 1 - 5 93.6% 
6 Teacher functioning 
The tutor stimulated the transfer of what I learned in this course to 
other contexts. 
1 - 5 93.4% 
7 Teacher functioning 
The tutor encouraged all students to participate in the (tutorial) 
group discussions. 
1 - 5 93.0% 
8 Teacher functioning The tutor was enthusiastic in guiding our group. 1 - 5 93.5% 
9 Teacher functioning The tutor initiated evaluation of the group functioning. 1 - 5 91.5% 
Note: At Maastricht University, the teaching staff member present in the classroom is referred to as “tutor.” Sections are 
commonly called “tutorial groups.”  
 
 
Panel A of Table 8 shows that the average peer GPA affects the evaluation of the group 
interaction positively. A one standard deviation increase in peer GPA leads to a 0.056 standard 
deviation increase in evaluation of group interaction. When redoing the analysis with each of the 
two items separately, we find that this result is only driven by the first item (see Table A4 in the 
                                                     
42
 Conditional on answering at least one of these questions the percentage of missing answers is between 5.9 and 9.2 
percent depending on the item (see Table 7). We apply multiple imputations by chained equations (MICE) with 10 
cycles. Note that imputing missing values might bias estimates if the missing at random assumption does not hold. 
We therefore also report ranges of point estimates using bounding methods in Table A5 in the Appendix, where we 
assume extreme values for missing answers. We also report results without any imputations in Table A6 in the 
Appendix. Results are very similar across these different models.   
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Appendix). This suggests that the students notice the better group functioning but do not perceive 
higher benefits from it—a result that is not surprising given the small magnitude of the estimated 
peer effects on grades. Hours worked and teacher functioning are not significantly affected by 
peer GPA.  
Panel B shows the results using the same specification for identifying peer effect 
heterogeneity as in Section 7. This model allows us to investigate if the effect of peer GPA on 
course evaluations is heterogeneous in terms of student and peer achievement. When comparing 
the different evaluation domains, we see that the peer variables are jointly significant in 
explaining the evaluation of the group interaction and not jointly significant in explaining the 
evaluation of the teacher or the self-study hours. The results for group interaction suggest that in 
particular the presence of high GPA peers matters. The point estimate suggests that a 20 percent 
increase in high GPA peers increases high GPA students’ evaluation of the group interaction by 
about 0.105 standard deviations. The estimated effects of increasing high GPA peers are also 
positive and about half the size for medium and low GPA students, although the effect for 
medium GPA students is not quite statistically significant (p-value: 0.128).  
All in all, our results suggest that, in our setting, group interaction is the most important of 
the three discussed channels. Interestingly, the effect of peer quality on group interaction appears 
to be linear. This implies that the inverse u-shaped pattern for low GPA students we found in 
Section 7 is driven by other unobserved factors. We do not find evidence for adjustment of 
teacher behavior or student effort.  
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Table 8: The Effect of Peer Composition on Student Evaluations  
Panel A 
     (1) (2) (3) 
 
Std. Group 
interaction 
Self-study 
hours  
Std. Teacher 
evaluation 
        
Standardized peer GPA 0.0561*** 0.0339 0.0017 
 
(0.015) (0.092) (0.013) 
Standardized GPA -0.0348*** 0.1353 -0.0426*** 
 
(0.010) (0.083) (0.009) 
    Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 
    Panel B 
     (2) (1) (3) 
        
High GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.5267*** -0.4390 0.0839 
 
(0.131) (0.858) (0.096) 
High GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1132 -0.8487 -0.0893 
 
(0.121) (0.852) (0.101) 
Middle GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2265 -0.0499 -0.0462 
 
(0.139) (0.992) (0.124) 
Middle GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0202 1.8395* 0.0055 
 
(0.110) (0.962) (0.114) 
Low GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2659** -0.3977 0.0650 
 
(0.119) (0.919) (0.114) 
Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0369 -1.6370* -0.0874 
 
(0.120) (0.956) (0.114) 
    Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 
F joint significance of peer variables 5.60*** 1.34 0.88 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.2391 0.5080 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variables 
are standardized Group interaction in Column (1), self-study hours in Column (2) and standardized teacher 
evaluation in Column (3). All specifications include course fixed effects, other-course fixed effects, teacher fixed 
effects as well dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late 
registration status. All regressions reported in Panel B also include standardized GPA. We imputed missing values as 
explained in Footnote 40.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Our results are consistent with findings of Booij et al. (2015), who study peer effects in 
settings similar to ours, where the peer group is defined at the section level at a Dutch University. 
They also find evidence for peer effects on group functioning and no evidence of peer effects on 
teacher functioning. Lavy et al. (2012) study the effect of the proportion of repeaters on student 
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outcomes in secondary schools. Using student surveys they identify changes in teachers’ 
pedagogical practices and increases in violence and classroom disruptions as important channels. 
Duflo et al. (2011) find in the context of Kenyan primary schools that teachers provide more 
effort, as measured by teacher absenteeism, when they are randomly assigned to a class of high 
compared to low achieving students. Taken together, these findings confirm the notion that the 
channels, which depend on the specific contexts, can create very heterogeneous peer effects. 
 
9 Conclusion 
This article adds to the discussion about threats to the identification of peer effects and provides 
empirical evidence of peer effects in higher education. In the analytical part of this paper, we 
have shown that measurement error can lead to substantial overestimation of peer effects in 
settings where peer group assignment is systematic. In settings where peer group assignment is 
random or based on an observable variable, however, measurement error will only lead to 
attenuation bias. These findings are good news for past and future peer effects studies that rely on 
natural random variation or exploit a perfectly observable assignment mechanism. Peer effects 
estimates obtained from studies with non-observable peer group assignment mechanism have to 
be interpreted with particular caution since they are prone to potentially severe upward bias due 
to measurement error. This bias is not the same as, and may occur on top of, any potential 
selection bias. 
In the empirical part of this paper, we have estimated peer effects in a sample where 
university students are randomly assigned to sections. Consistent with previous research, we find 
effects of average peer quality on student grades that are small in size but statistically significant. 
These average effects hide important heterogeneity however. While high and middle ability 
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students benefit from better peers, low ability students are harmed by their high ability peers. 
Evidence from students’ course evaluations suggests that peer effects are driven mainly by 
changes in group interaction and not by adjustments in teachers’ behavior or students’ effort. 
Our non-linear estimates suggest that it would be possible to achieve small overall gains 
in student performance by reorganizing peer groups. Without knowing the process that generates 
the observed peer effects, however, it is not clear whether this would be welfare enhancing. In 
principle, increased student performance can be a result of an increase in efficiency or an increase 
in students’ or teachers’ effort. An increase in student or teacher effort implies costs which 
should be weighed against the benefits from increased student performance. If, however, as our 
results suggest, the increase in students’ performance is driven by better group interaction, 
reorganization of peer groups can lead to higher efficiency, and welfare gains could therefore be 
possible. 
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APPENDIX 
A1 Classical Measurement Error and the Estimation of Peer Effects 
A1.1  Decomposing 𝜋1 
We rewrite Equation (2) as 
𝜋1 =
𝜓𝐼𝑉−𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆
1−𝑅2
          (A1) 
and take this as starting point to further decompose the peer effects estimator based on the data 
generating process and variables defined in Section 3. 𝜓𝐼𝑉 is a two-stage least square IV 
estimator. The first stage of this IV regression uses group dummies as instruments for 𝑥𝑖, and the 
predicted values of this first stage are thus group averages of 𝑥𝑖.  𝜓𝐼𝑉 is therefore equal to the 
coefficient from a bivariate regression of 𝑦𝑖𝑔 on ?̅?𝑔: 
𝜓𝐼𝑉 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̅?𝑔,𝑦𝑖𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
 .         (A2) 
By substituting 𝑦𝑖𝑔 with Equation (3) and rearranging, we get:
43
 
𝜓𝐼𝑉 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̅?𝑔,(𝛿+𝛽0𝑥𝑖
∗+ 𝛽1?̅?𝑔
∗ + 𝑢𝑖))
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
         (A3) 
𝜓𝐼𝑉 = 𝛽0
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
 + 𝛽1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
 .      
Analogously, we can express 𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆: 
𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖,𝑦𝑖𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
.         (A4) 
By substituting 𝑦𝑖𝑔 with Equation (3) and rearranging, we get 
𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖,(𝛿+𝛽0𝑥𝑖
∗+ 𝛽1?̅?𝑔
∗ + 𝑢𝑖)) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
         (A5) 
                                                     
43
 Note that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̅?𝑔, 𝑥𝑖
∗) =  𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗). 
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𝜓𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝛽0
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
+ 𝛽1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
.    
The 𝑅2 from first stage of the above IV estimation is equal to 
𝑅2 =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
.          (A6) 
Combining all the parts and substituting them into Equation (A1) we get: 
𝜋1 =
(𝛽0
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
 + 𝛽1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
)−(𝛽0
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
+ 𝛽1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
)
1−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
     (A7) 
𝜋1 = 𝛽1𝜙(
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
) + 𝛽0𝜙(
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
)      
𝜋1 = 𝛽1𝜙𝑊 + 𝛽0𝜙𝑄, 
where 𝜙 =
1
1−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
. 
A1.2  Understanding the Direction of the Overall Bias 
Here we show how measurement error affects 𝜙𝑊 and 𝜙𝑄.  
We start by rewriting 𝜙W  
𝜙W=
1
1−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
∗ (
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
)  = 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
1−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
.      (A8) 
Because 1=
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
+
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
 and 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
=
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
+
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
, we can further rewrite 𝜙W as 
follows: 
𝜙𝑊 =
[
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
]
[
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
]+〈
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
 −
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
〉
.       (A9) 
Note that the terms in […] are identical. In the absence of measurement error  
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(i.e., if 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) = 0), the terms in 〈… 〉 are equal to zero so that 𝜙𝑊 is equal to 1. In the presence 
of measurement error the denominator is larger than the numerator because 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
  > 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
, and 
therefore 0 < 𝜙𝑊 < 1. Note that when students are randomly assigned, 𝜙𝑊 is equal to the test 
reliability of ability 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
.
44
 
Now let’s have a look at 𝜙𝑄. If all ability measures have the same variance, we can use 
the formula for the variance of the mean of correlated variables to rewrite 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗) =  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑁𝑔
+
𝑁𝑔−1
𝑁𝑔
𝜌𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗) and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔) =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑁𝑔
+
𝑁𝑔−1
𝑁𝑔
𝜌𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗) +
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖)
𝑁𝑔
, where 𝑁𝑔 is the number of 
students in group g, and 𝜌 is the average correlation of the distinct student abilities in group g.45 
After canceling out 𝑁𝑔, we can rewrite 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔)
 as follows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+(𝑁𝑔−1)𝜌𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+(𝑁𝑔−1)𝜌𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) 
 .       (A10) 
We can now rewrite 𝑄 as follows:  
𝑄 =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+(𝑁𝑔−1)𝜌𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+(𝑁𝑔−1)𝜌𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) 
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) 
     (A11) 
𝑄 =
(1+ (𝑁𝑔−1)𝜌)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
(1+ (𝑁𝑔−1)𝜌)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) 
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) 
        
𝑄 =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖)
(1+ (𝑁𝑔−1)𝜌)
 
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖)
.         
                                                     
44
 Note that under random assignment, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔
∗) =  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑁𝑔
 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̅?𝑔) =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑁𝑔
+
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖)
𝑁𝑔
. Plugging these in to 
Equation (A8) and rearranging, you can see that 𝜙W = 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖)
. 
45
 ρ =
1
𝑁𝑔(𝑁𝑔−1)
∑
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖
∗,𝑥𝑗
∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖
∗)
𝑁𝑔
𝑖≠𝑗
. 
 - 50 - 
 
 
Without measurement error, the first and the second term in 𝑄 are equal, and thus 𝑄 (and 
𝜙𝑄) is equal to zero. With measurement error, the magnitude 𝑄 of depends on average 
correlation of the distinct student abilities 𝜌: under random assignment 𝜌 will be equal to zero, 
both terms in Equation (A11) will be the same and Q will be zero. If students tend to be grouped 
according to their ability, 𝜌 will be positive; the first term will be larger than the second term in 
Equation (A11), and 𝑄 (and 𝜙𝑄) will be positive. Given that students are systematically assigned 
to groups, the size of 𝑄 increases with 𝜌, 𝑁𝑔 and 𝛽0.  
To conclude, in the absence of measurement error, 𝜙𝑊 is equal to one and 𝜙𝑄 is equal to 
zero so that 𝜋1 is equal to 𝛽1. With measurement error, the sign of the overall bias depends on 
𝛽1𝜙𝑊 and 𝛽0𝜙𝑄. With random assignment (𝜌 = 0), 𝜙𝑄 is equal to zero and 𝜋1 is only 
attenuated. With systematic assignment (𝜌 > 0), 𝜙𝑄 is positive. The overall size of the bias then 
depends on whether the upward bias caused by 𝛽0𝜙𝑄 is larger than the downward bias—
assuming that peer effects are positive—caused by 𝛽1𝜙𝑊. 
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A2 Additional Figure 
 
Figure A1: Screenshot of the Scheduling Program Used by the SBE Scheduling Department  
 
 
 
Note: This screenshot shows the scheduling program Plus Enterprise Timetable©.  
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A3 Randomization Check 
 
We use the following empirical specification for our tests. Take 𝑦𝑖 as a 1xNi vector of the pre-
treatment characteristics of students in course i. The pre-treatment characteristics we consider are 
GPA, age, gender, and student ID rank. 𝑻 =  (𝑡1, … 𝑡𝑛) is a matrix of section dummies. Z is a 
matrix that includes dummies for other course taken at the same time, day and time of the 
sessions, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. 𝜀𝑖 is a vector of 
zero-mean independent error terms.  
Our randomization tests consist of running, for each course, the following regression:  
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝑻𝜷 + 𝒁𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖     (A12) 
Under the null-hypothesis of (conditionally) random assignment to sections within each 
course, β= 0, which means that the section assignment does not systematically relate to students’ 
pre-treatment characteristics, holding constant scheduling and stratification indicators. Therefore, 
we expect the F-test to be significant at the 5 percent level in approximately 5 percent of the 
cases, at the 1 percent level in approximately 1 percent of the cases, and at the 0.1 percent level in 
approximately 0.1 percent of the cases. Table 3 in Section 6 shows that the actual rejection rates 
are close to the rejection rates expected under random assignment. 
 To investigate this issue more closely, we also consider the distribution of p-values. 
Under the null hypothesis of conditionally random assignment, we would expect the p-values of 
all the regressions to closely fit a U[0,1] uniform distribution with a mean of 0.5 (Murdoch et al., 
2008). Figure A2 shows histograms of the p-values of all four specifications, all of which are 
roughly uniformly distributed. Column (2) of Table A1 shows the mean of the p-values over all 
regressions reported in Table 3. The mean of the p-values ranges from 0.48 to 0.52.  
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Figure A2: Distribution of F-test p-values of β from Equation (A1) as Reported in Table A1 
 
Note: These are histograms with p-values from all the regressions reported in Table 3. The vertical line in each 
histogram shows the 0.05 significance level.   
 
 
Table A1: Randomization Check: Mean p-values 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: 
Total Number of 
Courses 
Mean of p-value  
GPA 395 0.493 
Age 392 0.481 
Gender 389 0.508 
ID rank 395 0.523 
Note: This table is based on the regressions reported in Table 3. 
Column (2) shows the means of the p-values. 
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Table A2: Using first year GPA as Measure of Own and Peer Ability 
  (1) 
 
Std. Grade 
   
Standardized first year peer GPA 0.0198** 
 
(0.008) 
Standardized first year GPA 0.6506*** 
 
(0.027) 
  Observations 12,046 
R-squared 0.569 
Course FE YES 
Staff FE YES 
Other course FE YES 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the standardized course grade. Additional control include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, 
German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. Other-course fixed effects refer to the course that 
students are taking at the same time. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A3: Determinants of Survey Response (OLS) 
  (1) (2) 
 
Response Response 
      
Standardized peer GPA -0.0015 
 
 
(0.004) 
 Highest tertile * fraction of peers in highest tertile 
 
-0.0033 
  
(0.037) 
Highest tertile * fraction of peers in lowest tertile 
 
-0.0034 
  
(0.034) 
Middle tertile * fraction of peers in highest tertile 
 
-0.0212 
  
(0.034) 
Middle tertile * fraction of peers in lowest tertile 
 
0.0292 
  
(0.037) 
Lowest tertile * fraction of peers in highest tertile 
 
-0.0181 
  
(0.027) 
Lowest tertile * fraction of peers in lowest tertile 
 
-0.0248 
  
(0.029) 
Standardized GPA .0722*** .0607***  
 (.0038) (.0056) 
   
F joined significance of peer variables 
 
0.45 
Prob > F =    
 
0.8456 
   
Observations 45,332 45,332 
R-squared 0.104 0.104 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. Both regressions include 
fixed effects for the course, fixed effects for the other courses taken at the same time and teacher fixed effects. All 
specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status 
and late registration status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A4: Separate Regressions for Each Course Evaluation Question 
Nr. 
Question 
domain 
Dependent variable 
Coefficient of 
std. peer GPA 
SE std. 
peer GPA 
R-squared 
1 
Teacher 
evaluation 
Evaluate the overall functioning of your tutor 
in this course with a grade 
0.0034 (0.007) 0.844 
2 
Teacher 
evaluation 
The tutor sufficiently mastered the course 
content. 
-0.0148** (0.007) 0.749 
3 
Teacher 
evaluation 
The tutor stimulated the transfer of what I 
learned in this course to other contexts. 
0.0046 (0.007) 0.778 
4 
Teacher 
evaluation 
The tutor encouraged all students to 
participate in the (tutorial) group discussions. 
-0.0064 (0.009) 0.695 
5 
Teacher 
evaluation 
The tutor was enthusiastic in guiding our 
group. 
0.0092 (0.007) 0.795 
6 
Teacher 
evaluation 
The tutor initiated evaluation of the group 
functioning. 
0.0040 (0.009) 0.655 
7 
Group 
interaction 
My tutorial group has functioned well. 0.0822*** (0.014) 0.400 
8 
Group 
interaction 
Working in tutorial groups with my fellow-
students helped me to better understand the 
subject matters of this course. 
0.0198 (0.012) 0.348 
9 
Learning 
materials 
The learning materials stimulated me to start 
and keep on studying. 
-0.0267** (0.011) 0.287 
10 
Learning 
materials 
The learning materials stimulated discussion 
with my fellow students. 
-0.0166 (0.012) 0.285 
11 
Learning 
materials 
The learning materials were related to real life 
situations. 
-0.0147 (0.012) 0.254 
12 
Learning 
materials 
The textbook, the reader and/or electronic 
resources helped me studying the subject 
matters of this course. 
-0.0197 (0.012) 0.277 
13 
Learning 
materials 
The lectures contributed to a better 
understanding of the subject matter of this 
course. 
-0.0093 (0.010) 0.357 
14 
Learning 
materials 
In this course ELEUM has helped me in my 
learning. 
-0.0287** (0.012) 0.186 
15 
General 
evaluation 
Please give an overall grade for the quality of 
this course 
-0.0143 (0.011) 0.412 
16 
General 
evaluation 
The course fits well in the educational 
program. 
-0.0163 (0.011) 0.297 
17 
General 
evaluation 
The course objectives made me clear what 
and how I had to study. 
-0.0034 (0.013) 0.262 
18 
General 
evaluation 
The time scheduled for this course was not 
sufficient to reach the block objectives. 
0.0102 (0.013) 0.150 
19 
Self-study 
hours 
How many hours per week on the average 
(excluding contact hours) did you spend on 
self-study (presentations, cases, assignments, 
studying literature, etc.)? 
0.0067 (0.011) 0.279 
    Number of observations in each regression 14,982     
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. All 19 regressions include 
fixed effects for the course, fixed effects for the other course taken at the same time and teacher fixed effects. All 
specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status 
and late registration status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5: The Effect of Peer Composition on Student Evaluations with Lower and Upper 
Missing Values Bounds 
Panel A: 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Std. Group interaction Self-study hours Std. Teacher evaluation 
 
lower bound  upper bound lower bound  upper bound lower bound  upper bound 
              
Standardized peer GPA 0.0544*** 0.0562*** -0.0804 0.0665 -0.0003 0.0004 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.287) (0.101) (0.013) (0.013) 
Standardized GPA -0.0353*** -0.0340*** -1.8081*** 0.4489*** -0.0449*** -0.0400*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.231) (0.083) (0.009) (0.008) 
       Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 
R-squared 0.222 0.242 0.122 0.226 0.384 0.411 
       Panel B: 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
            
 High GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.5119*** 0.5247*** -0.4185 -0.7356 0.0873 0.0913 
 
(0.129) (0.131) (0.907) (2.292) (0.094) (0.096) 
High GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1314 -0.1059 -1.4862* 1.3448 -0.0863 -0.0728 
 
(0.116) (0.121) (0.873) (2.198) (0.094) (0.100) 
Middle GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2066 0.2153 -0.7174 3.9182 -0.0445 -0.0593 
 
(0.136) (0.139) (1.076) (2.569) (0.120) (0.125) 
Middle GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0208 0.0215 1.4074 5.3847** 0.0306 0.0104 
 
(0.110) (0.110) (1.079) (2.368) (0.111) (0.114) 
Low GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2688** 0.2681** -0.4423 -0.1719 0.0315 0.0754 
 
(0.116) (0.118) (1.013) (3.282) (0.116) (0.113) 
Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0366 0.0461 -1.1360 -4.2525 -0.0825 -0.0775 
 
(0.118) (0.120) (1.056) (2.989) (0.114) (0.115) 
       Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 
R-squared 0.244 0.224 0.227 0.126 0.411 0.385 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variables 
are standardized Group interaction in Columns (1) and (2), self-study hours in Columns (3) and (4), and standardized 
teacher evaluation in Columns (5) and (6). We assume extreme values for missing answers, which means that for all 
items we assign the lowest possible value of the used answering scale for our lower bound estimates and the highest 
possible answer on the answering scale for the upper bound estimates. All specifications include course fixed effects, 
other-course fixed effects, teacher fixed effects as well dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, 
Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. All regressions reported in Panel B also include Std. GPA. 
For a list of the exact question wording, see Table 2 in Section 3.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A6: The Effect of Peer Composition on Student Evaluations  
 (Without Bounding or Imputations) 
Panel A 
     (1) (2) (3) 
 
Std. Group 
functioning 
Self-study 
hours 
Std. Teacher 
functioning 
        
Standardized peer GPA 0.0550*** 0.0433 0.0010 
 
(0.015) (0.092) (0.013) 
Standardized GPA -0.0358*** 0.0530 -0.0466*** 
 
(0.010) (0.088) (0.009) 
    
 
15,285 15,232 14,654 
Observations 0.222 0.267 0.387 
    Panel B 
     (1) (2) (3) 
        
High GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.5297*** -0.7109 0.0820 
 
(0.131) (0.799) (0.099) 
High GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1180 -0.8725 -0.0830 
 
(0.120) (0.766) (0.101) 
Middle GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.1881 0.0058 -0.0492 
 
(0.141) (0.991) (0.127) 
Middle GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0230 1.7851* 0.0410 
 
(0.112) (0.946) (0.118) 
Low GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2727** -0.2952 0.0609 
 
(0.119) (0.978) (0.119) 
Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0454 -1.4976 -0.0665 
 
(0.121) (0.967) (0.120) 
    Observations 15,285 15,232 14,654 
F joined significance of peer variables 0.224 0.268 0.388 
Prob > F <.0001 .2169 0.5226 
Note: All regressions include fixed effects for the course, fixed effects for the other course taken at the same time 
and teacher fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The 
dependent variables are standardized Group interaction in Column (1), self-study hours in Column (2) and 
standardized teacher evaluation in Column (3). All specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the 
session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
